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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
LEGISLATION AGAINST PRACTICE OF LAW BY CORPORATIONS As
CONFLICTING WITH POWER OF SUPREME COURT TO PUNISH FOR
CONTEMPT.-Anl original proceeding was recently instituted in

the Supreme Court of Illinois by information in the name of

the People, on the relation of the Illinois State Bar Association
and the Chicago Bar Association, against the People's Stock
Yards State Bank, a banking corporation of Illinois, as respondent, seeking to have respondent punished for contempt of the
Supreme Court for engaging in the practice of law, and also to
enjoin it from continuing such practice.' Among the important
issues presented for consideration to the Supreme Court were
whether the legislature has the power to prohibit a corporation
from practicing law and whether or not such a statute excludes
the power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt a corporation which engages in the practice. These issues necessitate an inquiry as to whether the legislature has power to determine who shall or who shall not practice law, and if it has that
1 People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar
Association v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462.
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power, whether a statute prohibiting corporations from practicing law detracts from the inherent power of the Supreme
Court to regulate the conduct of its officers and others by contempt proceedings.
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that it was within the
power of the legislature to prohibit a corporation from practicing law and to provide a penalty for a violation thereof. They
also held that such statute does not exclude the power of the
Supreme Court to punish by contempt, nor in any way detract
from the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the
conduct of its officers and others by contempt proceedings.
Briefly, the court reasoned that the judicial power is vested
by the Constitution solely in the courts;2 that the grant of
such judicial powers to the courts included all the powers
necessary for complete performance of its judicial functions;
that the jurisdiction and power of the Supreme Court with
respect to the admission of attorneys to the practice of law are
inherent and implied; that, as a part of such inherent power
the Supreme Court has always had the power to discipline
or dis-bar attorneys for misconduct, such attorneys being
"officers" of the Supreme Court and their conduct as such being
subject to supervision by said court; that the Supreme Court
has power, necessarily implied from the powers heretofore mentioned, to punish unauthorized persons for usurping the privilege and office of acting as an attorney; that the Supreme Court
has power to punish one guilty of unauthorized practice of law
by contempt proceedings for acts committed either before the
Supreme Court, in the trial courts, or outside of court; that
a corporation cannot be licensed to practice law, either directly
or indirectly by the hiring of lawyers to carry on the business
of practicing law for it; that the legislature of Illinois has made
provision prohibiting the practice of law by a corporation, and
provided a penalty for the violation of the same;3 that it was
within the power of the legislature to make such provision; and
that such provision or statute does not exclude the power of the
Supreme Court to fix punishment for contempt of said court
involved in the usurpation by a corporation of the office of
attorney.
In the case of State v. Cannon,4 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was recently confronted with similar questions, although
the respondent was an individual and not a corporation. The
legislature of Wisconsin enacted a law restoring to the respon2

Constitution of Illinois, Article 6, Section 1; Article 3.

3 Cahill's Ill. Rev.
4 240 N. W. 441.

St. 1931, ch. 32, sees. 224-228.
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dent his license to practice law, which had been revoked by the
Supreme Court. 5 The Supreme Court then held the act of the
legislature unconstitutional as an encroachment on the judicial
power. The court, considering the respective functions of the
legislative and judicial bodies, held that the legislature has the
power to exact of those desiring to practice law such qualifications as, in the legislature's judgment, are necessary to protect
citizens from becoming unconscious victims of dishonesty or
incompetence; that courts cannot license as attorneys those not
possessing the qualifications deemed by the legislature necessary
for the protection of public interest; but that the statutory
qualifications required of attorneys cannot preclude the court
from fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the
court for the proper administration of judicial functions; that
the qualifications required by the legislature constitute only the
minimum qualifications and merely limit the class from which
the court must make its selections; and that admission of attorneys to practice is a judicial function, the legislature not having
the power to compel courts to admit to the bar persons deemed
by the courts unfit to exercise the prerogatives of attorneys at
law. This late Wisconsin decision thus clearly indicates that
the court has the ultimate power of determining who shall or
shall not practice law, and that the court cannot be deprived
of this power by legislation.
In Georgia, where the power to grant charters to corporations
is vested in the courts by a statute which specifically excepts
the classes of corporations which may not be so chartered, but
in terms neither authorizes nor prohibits the formation of a
corporation to practice law, the Supreme Court recently held in
the case of Boykin, Solicitor General v. Hopkins et al.0 that the
court could not, even by implication, charter a corporation for
that purpose, as a corporation could not possibly comply with
the conditions required for admission to the profession.
Among others, the following states have typical statutes:
Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, MichNew York, Oregon, Rhode Island,
igan, Missouri, New Jersey,
7
Utah, and Washington.
5 Laws (Wis.) 1931, ch. 480.
6162 S. E. 796 (Ga. 1932).
7 2 Ark. Laws, 1929, Act. 182; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Mar. Supp. 1926),
55-56; Md. Ann. Code (Bagby, 1924), Art. 27, sec. 19; Mass. Gen. Laws
(1921), ch. 221, secs. 46-47; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), ch. 197, sec.
10175; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929), ch. 78, secs. 11692-93; N. J. Comp. Stat.
(Supp. 1924), secs. 52-214 p-r (Supp. 1930) 52-214t; N. Y. Cons. Laws
(1930), ch. 41, secs. 280, 271a; Ore. Code Ann. (1930), sees. 32-504 to
32-506, 22-1213; R. L Gen. Laws (1923), ch. 401, sec. 6238; Utah Laws
(1927), ch. 78, sec. 345; 2 Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington, 1922), sec.
3231 (9)-(applies to trust companies only).
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These statutes, so common among the states, accepted as constitutional, are in themselves an indication that the legislature
not only can but has excluded corporations from the field of
legal practice.
In the case of People v. People's Trust Coimpany,8 the trust
company was convicted for violation of section 280 of the New
York Penal Code, which forbids the practice of law by a corporation.
In the case of In re Eastern Idaho Loan and Trust Company,9
the respondent was held to have violated the Idaho Statute prohibiting a corporation from practicing law, and was also held
to be actually guilty of contempt of the Supreme Court by
virtue of such practice. The Idaho statute throws light on both
angles of this question, namely, the power of the legislature to
prohibit a corporation from practicing law, and also the power
of the Supreme Court to punish such corporation for contempt
of court. It provides that "If any person shall practice law
.
. or hold himself out as qualified to practice law in this
state without having been admitted to practice therein by the
Supreme Court and without having paid all license fees now
or hereafter prescribed by law . . . he is guilty of contempt
both in the Supreme Court and District Court for the District
in which he shall so practice or hold himself out as qualified to
practice."
In Montana, unlawful practice is made contempt by a statute, which is construed in the case of In re Bailey,'0 wherein the
Supreme Court said, speaking of the acts of the respondent, "It
is not contested that the foregoing acts, if they constitute contempt at all, are a contempt of this court. Indeed, this could
scarcely be questioned, in view of the provisions of Title V, Part
I, Code of Civil Procedure, whereby the authority to admit
attorneys to practice is vested solely in this court."
In another later Montana case, 1' the Supreme Court said,
again speaking of the acts of respondent, "It cannot be questioned that . . . respondent was engaged in practicing law
in the district court of Lincoln County. . .
Neither can
it be questioned that in thus engaging in the practice he was
guilty of contempt of this court."
In Vermont and in New Jersey we find authority for the
fact that unlawful practice of law constitutes contempt, in the
8 180 App. Div. (N. Y.) 494.
9 49 Idaho 280.
10 50 Mont. 365.

11 54 Mont. 476.
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In In re Morse,12 the Supreme Court 'of

Vermont said, "This brings us to the question whether this court
has authority to punish for contempt one who, pretending to the
office of attorney, practices law before the courts of this state.
It is true we have no constitutional or statutory provision on
the subject, but none is necessary, nor is it necessary to search
the common law for authority, since such authority is fairly
to be implied from the express power conferred on this court in
the matter of licensing attorneys. The rule of constitutional
interpretation announced in McCullough v. Maryland,'3 that
that which was reasonably appropriate and necessary to the
exercise of a granted power was to be considered as accompanying the grant, has been so universally applied that it suffices
merely to state it, and as there is nothing in the inherent nature
of the power to'deal with contempt that causes it to be an exception to such rule, there can be no reason for refusing to apply
it to that subject. Our conclusion is that this court has implied
power to punish for contempt persons pretending to practice as
attorneys before the courts of this state
"
In the Morse case, the court also said, "It is claimed, too,
that since the respondent 's operations were confined to the justice courts he is not amenable to this court. But we think that
if he is answerable anywhere, for the offense charged, it is this
court. He is not charged with having violated a mandate of
the inferior court, or with misbehavior in that court, but rather
with intruding himself into an office of this court, pretending
to act under the authority and with the sanction of this court.
The right to act as an attorney is everywhere recognized as a
privilege of a personal nature, not open to all, but limited to
persons of good moral. character, possessing special qualifications
ascertained and certified after a long course of study, both general and professional. . . . Authority to confer or withhold
this privilege is usually confided to the courts. . .
. (Act
No. 63 of 1906, now G. L. 1591) provides: 'Justices of the
Supreme Court . . . shall make, adopt and publish and
may alter or amend rules regulating the admission of attorneys
to the practice of law before the courts of this state.' We need
not pause to consider whether prior to this enactment this court
had authority to deal with persons pretending to practice law
as attorneys before the justice courts, for certain it is, it now
has precisely the same authority concerning such persons that
it has respecting like offenders in this or the county courts."
In the case of New Jersey Photo Engraving Company v. Carl
Schonert and Sons,14 there is to be found dicta to the effect
12 98

Vt. 85.

13 4 Wheat. 316.
14 95 N. J. Eq. 12.
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that "practicing law in our state, without being duly licensed
. .
.
for which the
[constitutes] a contempt of court
offender may be adequately punished by the court in which the
offense is committed."
This illustrates the attitude of the courts of two states without
statutory provision for the fact that unlawful practice constitutes contempt, New Jersey holding such practice to be contempt
of the court in which the offense is committed, and Vermont
holding that such practice constitutes contempt of the Supreme
Court as well, thus going still further to support the doctrine
laid*down by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of People
v. People's Stock Yards State Bank.
In the case of People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin,15 Mr. Justice
Cardozo, speaking for the Court of Appeals of New York, in
sustaining the right and duty of the New York courts to investigate ambulance chasing and "any other practices obstructive
or harmful to the administration of justice," told of a similar
investigation in early English times. He said, relating to the
English investigation: "In Easter term, 9 Eliz. 1567, the Lord
Chief Justice of the Common Pleas delivered a charge to a jury
made up of officers, clerks, and attorneys, who had been summoned by special writ to inquire into wrong doing by officers of
the court. This was not a grand jury in the usual sense, for
the. Common Pleas was not a court of criminal jurisdiction. The
ordinary courts of criminal jurisdiction were the King's or
Queen's Bench and the Courts of the Justices of Assize, Oyer
and Terminer and Gaol Delivery. The special jury was instructed to inquire into falsities, erasures, contempts, and misprisions 'de onunibus falsitatibus, de rasuris, de contemptibus,
et de misprisionibus.' Those guilty of falsities were the ariibulance chasers of the day. 'A falsity,' said the Lord Chief
Justice, 'is where a man will outwardly set a shew, a face, and
countenance that he doth well, and truly knowing inwardly and
to himself that this is not so but mere subtlety and falsehood,
as, for example, if he will sue forth of purpose false process,
or wittingly of himself will minister a false and foreign plea,
not taking it of his client.' An erasure, as its name imports,
is a wrongful alteration of a record of the court. A contempt
is committed by 'such as contemn and break our orders and
rules, and will not obey the orders of this court; within this
are not only officers, clerks, and attorneys contained, but also
any other stranger that contemneth the same.' "
This early English doctrine goes far toward supporting the
holding of the Illinois Supreme Court in the instant case. It
states the admitted proposition that attorneys may be guilty
15 248 N. Y. 465.
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of contempt of court and also any stranger who contemns and
breaks the court rules.
In California and New York, there is also authority, though
less direct, for the proposition held by the Illinois Supreme
Court. The codes of both of these states provide that a corporation may be formed for any purpose for which individuals
may lawfully associate themselves. The Supreme Courts of both
states have held, in the cases of People v. Merchant's Protective
16
Corporation
and In re Co-Operative Law Company,17 that
such provisions have no application to the practice of law by
a corporation. The courts of these states have lent at least
indirect support for the proposition that the legislature can prohibit a corporation from practicing law, by virtue of their construction of these statutes to exclude the practice of law by a
corporation.
Having seen that legislatures may unquestionably prohibit
corporations from practicing law, reference must now be had
to some of the authorities dealing more particularly with the
power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt, and the
influence over that power which the legislature may or may not
exert. "Since the constitution vests the judicial power in designated tribunals, it follows that the essentials of jurisdiction
there conferred are unalterable and indestructible and can
neither be increased nor diminished by the legislature, nor can
the inherent powers of the courts thus established be abrogated
or abridged. . . . The legislature cannot in the absence
of constitutional provisions, limit or
regulate the inherent power
18
of courts to punish for contempt.',
There are many cases in various jurisdictions supporting the
doctrine stated above. In the case of State v. District Court
of First Judicial District in and for Lewis and Clark County,' 9
the court held that the legislature may prescribe modes of procedure in contempt proceedings, but it cannot take away or
abridge the court's power to inflict punishment for contempt.
In the case of Ex parte Garner,20 the court held that the
legislature may not, whether by procedural rules or the inadequacy of the penalty fixed, substantially impair or destroy the
implied power of a constitutional court to punish for contempt.
16 189 Cal. 531.
17

198 N. Y. 479.

18 6 American and English Encyclopedia of Law (2nd Ed.), p. 1048,

and cases there cited.
19 58 Mont. 276.
20

179 Cal. 409.
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In the case of Ex parte Le Mond, 21 the court held that the
legislature has no power to take away, abridge, impair, limit or
regulate the power of courts of record to punish for contempt.
Illinois is not a stranger to similar judicial pronouncements.
In the case of William O'Neil v. People,22 it was held that the
court might punish for contempt despite the fact that the act
might likewise constitute a statutory crime, and that respondent
might be indicted for the same offense. And in People v.
Peters,2 3 the court reiterated that the power to punish for contempt is inherent.
24
In the case of People ex rel. John Rusch v. Robert White,
the court held that the power to punish contempt being inherent
in the courts, the legislature may not restrict their jurisdiction
in contempt proceedings; but that it may aid their jurisdiction
or enlarge their powers by declaring certain improper conduct
to be a contempt which was not theretofore so regarded. It has
no power, however, to make that a contempt which in the nature
of things cannot be a contempt, or to punish crimes as such by
contempt proceedings.
The conclusion is inevitable that the Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case of People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank,
where the court so definitely answered the question dealt with
in this discussion, did so upon ample reason and authority, thus
lending great support to the profession's ethical standards, and
going far to-secure to the public the confidence in the profession
which those standards merit.
RIGHT OF SURETY ON A BAIL BOND TO ARREST His PRINCIPAL
IN ANOTHER STATE AND RETURN HIM TO THE STATE WHERE THE
BOND REQUIRES His PRESENCE WITHOUT RESORTING TO EXTRA-

a surety has a right to recapture his principal and
return him to the state from which he fled, is not such surety,
as an individual, asserting a prerogative right which a state
with its sovereign power cannot assert? A state must conform
to the technical procedure of extradition to effectuate the end
accomplished by a surety without even resorting to the aid of
legal process. However, a review of the historical basis for
the decisions which assert such right in the surety, dispels the
apparent anomaly.
DITION.-If

21295 Mo. 586.
22 113 IM. App. 195.
28 395 I1. 223.
24

334 I1. 465.
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In an early case reported in England in 17041 the court in
its opinion says: "The bail have their principal always upon a
string, and may pull the string whenever they please, and render him in their own discharge; they may take him up even

upon a Sunday, and confine him until the next day, and then
render him;

.

.

.

and the doing it on Sunday is no service

of process, but rather like the case where the sheriff arrests by
virtue of a process of court on Saturday, and the party escapes,
he may take him on a Sunday for that is only a continuance of
the former imprisonment."
The right of a surety on a bail bond to recapture his principal
without resorting to process is in its essence vastly different
from th.e necessity of a state to recapture a fugitive through
the medium of extradition. The surety's power is not such as
is implied by operation of the law. Such right arises from
the private undertaking implied in the furnishing of the bond.
When bail is furnished the principal is remanded to the custody
of the surety. This custody follows the principal wherever he
may go. The principal has placed in the surety the power to
arrest him at any time and surrender him to the court and,
if necessary, to restrain2 him of his liberty: to this extent the
surety becomes a jailor.
This doctrine is affirmed in the case of In re Von Der Ahe,3
a case originating in the courts of Pennsylvania, from where it
was taken to the courts of the United States. A writ of habeas
corpus was sued out by the petitioner Chris Vdn Der Ahe
against Nicholas A. Bendell commanding the respondent to show
by what right he holds and deprives the petitioner of his liberty. The respondent contended he possessed the right to detain
the petitioner by virtue of these facts: One Baldwin had
brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania, an action of trespass for malicious prosecution
against Von Der Abe; under the laws and practice in Pennsylvania, the suit was begun by the issuance of a capias, by virtue
of which capias Von Der Abe was arrested by the sheriff of the
county; to procure his release from custody and avoid imprisonment, Von Der Ahe had one Nimick become his bail on a capias
bond, the condition of which was that Von Der Ahe "shall satisfy the condemnation money and costs, or surrender himself
unto the custody of the sheriff of Allegheny County, or in default thereof, that the said W. A. Nimick, the above named bail,
will do so for him." Von Der Ahe was thereupon released and
'Anonymous, 6 Mod. 231.
2 Reese v. United States, 9 Wall. 13.
3 85 Fed. 959.
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upon a trial of the case judgment was rendered in Baldwin's
favor and affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Von
Der Ahe failed to pay the judgment or surrender himself to
the sheriff. Accordingly Nimick, the bail took out a bail piece,
which is the form of process under the Pennsylvania statutes,
authorizing the respondent to execute the same and to take, seize
and surrender to the sheriff of Allegheny County the said Von
Der Abe. In pursuance of this authority the respondent took
Von Der Ahe into custody in St. Louis, Mo., and by force
brought him back to Pittsburgh for delivery to the county
sheriff. Whereupon the petitioner sued out this writ of habeas
corpus contending such arrest was unwarranted and contrary to
article 5 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States in that he was deprived of his liberty without due process
of law. In denying the writ, the court, in its opinion said:
"The arrest of a principal by his bail is based on the relationship the parties have established between themselves, and not on
any process of the court; and hence the bail may make the
arrest in another state than that where the bond is given, and
transfer him thereto, without infringing his right under the
Federal Constitution to due process of law.

.

.

It is well

settled that bail from another state [New York] may arrest his
principal in this state [Pennsylvania]

.

.

.

and take him

out of the state for the purpose of surrendering him in discharge
of his recognizance.

.

.

.

When bail is given, the principal

is regarded as delivered to the custody of his sureties. Their
dominion is a continuance of the original imprisonment."
Although the contract with his bail may appear to place the
principal in involuntary servitude for the duration of the bail,
it is by this means that the principal may escape actual incarceration in prison. His liberty is certainly far less restrained
than it would be if he were within the prison cell. However,
the law of necessity must place some inhibition upon the principal's freedom to insure his appearance in court at trial, for
the object of bail is to insure his presence in court. Consequently to effectuate this end, the law allows the principal to
contract with a surety as he does. The doctrine conforms to
principles of legal right. It aids the principal and protects the
surety. Inasmuch as the bail, with few exceptions, forfeits the
bond if he fails to produce the principal for trial, he is given
the right, as the courts say, to restrain the principal so far as
necessity demands.
With the advent of compensated sureties the reason for the
protection afforded at common law to gratuitous sureties fails.
A single case will serve to illustrate the strictness with which
forfeitures against sureties are construed. One Gingrich was
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arrested for committing an assault with a knife upon one Elizabeth Gingrich. He was arrested and charged with the offense
and gave bail with good and sufficient security for his appearance at the next term of court to answer the charge and stand
trial. During the interim between the accusation and the next
term of court, the principal was indicted by a grand jury for
an assault with intent to kill and murder. At the day set for
trial the accused failed to appear and his recognizance was taken
and declared forfeited. Thereupon a scire facias issued against
the surties. Upon the trial of the scire facias, the sureties in
defense to a judgment against them upon their bond contended
that at the time of the forfeiture of the bond and for a long
time prior thereto the principal was in another state, sick and
disabled and could not be removed nor brought and surrendered
to the trial court without great danger of the loss of his life.
The court sustained a demurrer to the plea, ruling that the fact
that the principal was ill in anoher state was not sufficient to
discharge the surety on the bond.4 Nor is it an answer to a
scire facias on a recognizance that a principal is confined in
another county or another state on a different charge. 5 Of
course, the purpose of a recognizance is in its essence to insure
the appearance of the person accused of the offense and not to
penalize the sureties or provide for a source of revenue to the
state.0 But it is nevertheless settled law that bail will only be
exonerated where the performance of the condition is rendered
impossible by act of God, by act of the obligee, or by law, but
the exoneration even within these three classes is limited and
restricted. Where the principal dies before the day of performance, the case is within the first category; where the court before
which the principal is bound to appear is abolished without
qualification, the case is within the second; if the principal is
arrested in the state where the obligation is given and sent out
of the state by the governor, upon the requisition of the governor
of another state, it is within the third. However, when the bail
of a party arrested have suffered him to go into another state,
and while there he is, after forfeiture of the recognizance, delivered up upon the requisition of the governor of a third state
for a crime committed in it, convicted and imprisoned in such
third state, the bail are not discharged from liability on their
recognizance on a suit by the state where the person was first
arrested.7 There has in this instance been no such act of law
as will discharge the bail. Because the recognizance is strictly
4 Gingrich v. The People, 34 Ill. 448.
5 Mix v. The People, 26 Ill. 32.
6 The People v. Evanuk, 320 Ill. 336.
7

Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U. S. 366.
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construed against the bail, the bail may take his principal when
and where he pleases.8 If this were not so the bail might often
be exposed to great and unnecessary hazard. 9
The doctrine that the bail may take his principal anywhere
and return him for trial in the state wherein he was charged has
been so firmly established that the Supreme Court of New York
as early as 1810 confirmed the right of the bail to break open
the outer door of the dwelling house to take the principal. 10
One Pierpont Edwards as surety together with Nicolls became
obligated on a recognizance in New Haven, Connecticut. Nicolls
removed to New York. At about 12 o'clock at night while
Nicolls and his family were in bed, Ingersoll, agent for Edwards,
and others demanded the house to be opened or they would
break it open. Nicolls did not open the door and soon after they
broke open the outer door, found Nicolls rising and commanded
him to dress. They hurried him to the river, and pushed him
into a boat without his hat or overcoat, which were afterwards
brought to him. When Nicolls asked why he was treated in that
manner, one Morgan said he had a bail-piece and authority to
carry him to Connecticut. Nicolls thereupon sued Ingersoll for
The court in
assault and battery and false imprisonment.
affirming the verdict and judgment rendered for the defendant
by a jury in the trial court said: "The verdict authorizes us
..
to presume that a demand was made before entry .
That the bail may break open the outer door of the principal,
if necessary, in order to arrest him, follows, as a necessary consequence, from the doctrine that he has the custody of the principal; his power is anologous to that of the sheriff who may
break open an outer door to take a prisoner, who has escaped
from arrest."
In Illinois in case of People v. Paulsen,1 the court said:
"A surety who has entered into a recognizance for the appearance of one accused of crime is entitled to arrest such person
at any place in the state." And it has been as definitely established that a person who enters into a recognizance for the
appearance in court of a defendant may arrest and return such
defendant wherever he may be found even though he be in
another state, and the surety may authorize another to arrest
the principal for the purpose of returning him. 12 The Illinois
Statutes provide that "In all cases of bail, under this act, it
8Ex parte Edward Lafonta, 2 Rob. 495; Ruggles v. Corey, 3 Conn. 419.
9 Parker v. Bidwell, 3 Conn. 84.
10 Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145.
11 146 Ill.
App. 534.
App. 96.
12 Sallee v. Werner et al., 171 Ill.
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shall be lawful for the bail to arrest and secure the body of the
principal, until a surrender can be made to the sheriff of the
county where the suit may be pending or to the court to which
the process was returnable and may, by indorsement upon the
back of a duly certified copy of the bail bond, authorize any
other person to arrest, secure and surrender the body of the
principal.' 1 3 And again the Illinois Criminal Code provides,
"For the purpose of surrendering the principal, the sureties or
any of them may arrest the principal at any place or may
authorize any other person to make the arrest. 14 Also "the
sureties or any of them may require the sheriff, coroner, or any
constable of the county where the principal may be found, to
make the arrest within his county, by producing a certified copy
of the recognizance, and, in person or by agent, accompanying the
officers to receive the person arrested.1 5 On such surrender,
and delivery to him of a certified copy of the recognizance, the
sheriff or warden shall take such person into custody, and by
writing, acknowledge such surrender, and thereupon the sureties
shall be discharged from such recognizance, upon payment of
all costs occasioned by any proceedings upon the recognizance. ''16

It cannot strongly be doubted that a surety on a bail bond
may arrest his principal in another state and return him to the
state where the bond requires his presence without resorting
to extradition. We have seen that the courts have almost universally held that the principal, by his contract of bail, places
himself voluntarily in the custody of his surety.
During the reign of the early common law, sureties were, to
a great extent, gratuitous. They received no compensation for
the risk undertaken. Hence the doctrine of strictissimi juris
was involved. The contract of bail was construed in favor of
the surety. That is why the courts allow the principal to contract with the surety so as to place himself within the custody
of the surety. Normally, on principle of public policy, a man
may not contract so as virtually to enslave himself. The authorities evolve the principle here expressed upon the doctrine
of contract. It is said that the principal may permit the assertion of such rights by the surety to affect his, the principal's,
freedom pending the trial.
But with the advent of the compensated surety need the doctrine asserted by the courts be so extensive in its operation?
Cahill's Ill. Rev.
Cahill's Ill. Rev.
15 Cahill's Ill. Rev.
16 Cahill's Ill. Rev.
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St. 1931, ch. 16, sec. 18.
St. 1931, ch. 38, sec. 644.
St. 1931, ch. 38, sec. 645.

St. 1931, ch. 38, sec. 647:

DISCUSSION

OF RECENT DECISIONS

A surety, under our present system of jurisprudence is generally remunerated for the risk he undertakes. If, as has been
seen, the surety may enter the home of the principal to recapture and return him to the jurisdiction requiring his presence
for trial, may such surety assert his rights in defiance of the
officers of that other state? Consider the following example.
The principal has left the jurisdiction wherein he has been
charged, and the surety has recaptured him for the express
purpose of returning him to the original jurisdiction. While
under such custody the principal escapes and immediately commits a breach of the peace. Can it be said that the surety can
claim the custody of the principal in defiance of the officers
who arrest him for such breach of the peace? It is not logical
that the sovereign right of the state should be subjected to a
prior right possessed by the surety.
In fewer words, to what further extent may the surety assert
himself as implied from the powers he now apparently possesses?
The process should be one of restriction and not of expansion.
The tendency of the Illinois Statute1 7 is to alleviate to a degree the liability of the bail for the non-appearance of the
principal when such non-appearance is not caused by the fault
or negligence of the surety. Consequently, as the bail is protected, he need not assert the drastic powers as expressed in
the early New York case above cited. The trend of decisions
should foster the inhibition of such prerogatives. Courts may
well follow the thought expressed in the Criminal Code of
Illinois.
17 Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. 1931, ch. 38, sec. 649(6).

